What Philosophical Practices are Conducive for Philosophy Education for Democracy?

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Education for Democracy

Education for democracy is concerned with encouraging democracy, rather than learning about democracy. The aim is to develop a participative, deliberative and communitarian citizenry.

UNESCO recognises philosophy as being especially pertinent for education for democracy. It teaches us to make judgments for ourselves, subject only to the authority of reason, and as a result, the teaching of philosophy leads to the "establishment and maintenance of peace," (UNESCO, 2006, p.5) and "contributes to the development of free citizens" (UNESCO, 2006, p.12). The title of the UNESCO publication *Philosophy: A School of Freedom* (2007) summarises this well.

Yet even though philosophy teaching is valuable for education for democracy, this does not mean that all philosophical practices are equally suited to this task. The issue I consider in this paper is what sort of teaching and learning methods would be appropriate for philosophy education for democracy (rather than teaching the philosophy of democracy or social philosophy)? If, to use Lipman's phrase, philosophy is to function educationally (2004, p. 6) for democratic aims, what practices should we use?

My approach to this question will draw on the Philosophy for Children literature, which says a great deal about how and why philosophy, suitably reconstructed, is well-suited for education for democracy (Sharp, 1991; Cam, 2000; Lipman, 1998, 2003; Burgh et al., 2006). My contribution is to compare and illustrate two major practices of teaching philosophy, and to analyse their suitability for education for democracy. I argue that the practices of academic philosophy are not suitable while the Community of Philosophical Inquiry approach is perfectly suited.

Community of Philosophical Inquiry

One practice of philosophy teaching is that typically associated with university and secondary philosophy subjects. I call this 'academic philosophy'. Even though there are various methods and techniques used, underlying them all is the aim that students master a body of philosophical knowledge including arguments, counter-arguments, positions, theories, philosophers, schools of thought, texts, distinctions, conceptions, conclusions and issues. To deal with this body of knowledge, students also should develop critical thinking skills related to stating, analysing and evaluating arguments.

A second practice of philosophy education is the tradition that developed from Lipman and the Philosophy for Children movement. For the purpose of this paper I will refer to this tradition by the term Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI). I use this term to refer to a tradition of philosophical pedagogy that is broader than Lipman's original Philosophy for Children materials, but which has arisen out of and is indebted to these materials and which is now "a sub-discipline of philosophy with its own history and traditions" (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. vii). The CoPI tradition is applicable for all people, and has its own distinctive pedagogy and approach to philosophy, based on engaging participants in philosophical inquiry. The core praxis is the Community of Inquiry (CI) involving a group of people who engage in critical dialogue and reflective deliberation, inquiring together for a common goal.

Although I compare CoPI to academic philosophy, I do so only to highlight some of the methods needed for philosophy education for democracy, and some of the methods which are not suitable. I do not claim that there is only one unified style of academic philosophy; that every style of philosophy employed at an academic level is completely different from CoPI; that the methods of CoPI could not be usefully employed in an academic setting; that academic philosophy is not an appropriate way of teaching philosophy; or that CoPI is always a better way of philosophising.

I argue that CoPI is better suited for education for democracy because it is better able to educate for democratic skills and dispositions. I argue that these outcomes cannot be easily met by academic philosophy because of the emphasis on mastering the scholarship. Furthermore, students learn as much by how we teach as by what we teach, so if the outcome sought is democratic students, then the methods themselves must be democratic. I argue that CoPI is deeply democratic in its methods, and so it is better suited for education for democracy than academic philosophy, which tends to be exclusive and elitist.

Philosophy Education for Democracy

There are at least three main types of outcomes we would expect from a programme of philosophy education for democracy. Students would be expected to develop democratic:

1. Knowledge: A body of philosophical knowledge about democracy such as concepts, positions, theories, problems and arguments related to freedom, justice, responsibility, etc. This includes know-that or what Delors (1996) calls 'learning to know'.
2. Skills: The tools and methods for democratic decision-making such as giving reasons and considering assumptions. This includes know-how or what Delors (1996) calls 'learning to do.' Philosophical ways of thinking provide these skills.
3. Dispositions: Social and cognitive dispositions needed for democratic living and decision-making such as open-mindedness and tolerance. This includes valuing or what Delors (1996) calls learning to be. The general spirit of reasonable and open inquiry in philosophy can provide these dispositions.

Out of these three outcomes, the third is the most important for education for democracy. The primary aim of education for democracy is cultivating students who *are* democratic, which goes beyond knowing about democracy or having democratic skills and requires the promotion of democratic dispositions.

Not all philosophical practices can deliver these outcomes. Dispositions in particular cannot be 'taught' in the normal way we think of teaching. We can present students with as much propositional knowledge as we like but this will not make them a reasonable person. We can even teach them all the skills of reasoning we like, but this does not mean they will employ them.

Although the dispositions cannot be 'taught', they can be enculturated or educated for. To understand how, we need to draw on the tradition that derives from Vygotskiian social learning (1986), and includes situated learning in a 'community of practice' (Wenger, 1988), and more specifically, learning by enculturation in a culture of thinking (Tishman et al., 1993; 1995; Perkins et al., 1993). This tradition acknowledges that the way in which something is taught has as much educative force as what is taught, or to put it differently, the hidden curriculum is as influential as the explicit curriculum.

The implication of this community learning theory is that if we want to have philosophical education for democracy, we have to exemplify democratic practices in the pedagogy itself. For a practice of philosophical education to be suitable for education for democracy it must provide a model of a democratic community, so we can cultivate democratic dispositions in students by enculturating them into this community.

A functioning democracy relies on dialogue and deliberation amongst the citizens (see Burgh et al., 2006 and Golding, 2008). This is different than what might be seen as the hallmarks of modern democracies - voting and elections. Democracy requires citizens to deliberate about social issues and problems, to participate in social dialogue and problem-solving and to do this out of concern for the common good. It is not enough to vote for the candidate who will best serve your own individual interests.

So, to educate for democratic dispositions, a philosophical practice must provide a model of a dialogical, collaborative, inclusive, community (rather than authoritative, monological and exclusive) that students can be initiated into.

Teaching philosophy in the academic tradition can help students to know about democracy, and have critical skills, but is unlikely to lead to students who *are* democratic. The culture that students are initiated into is exclusive and elitist (after all it is the heir to Plato's anti-democratic academy). Academic philosophy is restricted to only the 'best and the brightest', and the aim, at least initially, is to learn the philosophical scholarship rather than to participate in it. Such practices are not conducive for cultivating democratic dispositions and thus not conducive for education for democracy.

Required Changes from Academic Philosophy

If there is to be philosophy education for democracy there needs to be a reconstruction (in the Deweyan sense) or an opening (MacColl, 1994, p. 5) of the scholarly and technical practice of academic philosophy. As Lipman explains, academic philosophy would have to be:

> "redesigned and reconstructed so as to make it available and acceptable and enticing to children. Moreover the pedagogy by which the subject was to be presented would have to be just as drastically redesigned as the subject itself" (Lipman, 1991, p. 262).

Brennifer explains what this reconstructed practice of philosophy would need to be like:

> "… the common assumptions about philosophy need to be put aside, starting with its elitist and exclusively academic image as a particular 'subject'. The object here is to think of philosophy in a different way: as a practice that invites all members of the public, whatever their personal level of education or their general knowledge, to engage in dialogue and reflection" (2007, p. 180).

The CoPI tradition presents just such a reconstruction of philosophy. It is better suited for developing democratic dispositions because the CI exemplifies democratic practices. Through a Vygotskiian process of collaborative learning, students internalise the democratic culture of a CI: "collaborative dialogue, problem-solving and deliberative decision making" (Burgh et al., 2006, p. 88).

The CI is a practice to participate in rather than a body of scholarship to learn about. The Philosophy for Children (P4C) teacher's job is to help their students to uncover philosophical problems in their own experience and then to follow the inquiry where it leads to resolve these problems, rather than to cover a pre-decided agenda of positions and arguments. Students "actively engage in dialogue over topics of interest, in the service of constructing knowledge and common understanding, and internalising the discourse of the inquiring community" (Pardales and Girod, 2006, p. 306). "Students and teachers can talk together as persons and as members of the same community" (Lipman, 1988, p. 41-42), participating in genuine inquiry and making judgements about how to deal with diverse views. By participating in the reasonable and collaborative CI students learn to operate democratically, because it enculturates the civic values and democratic character needed for reasonable participation, collaboration and deliberation.

To illustrate why the CoPI approach is superior for education for democracy, I present an example of what might occur in one practice of academic philosophy and then an example of what might occur in a CoPI class. To better illustrate the different approaches, both examples depict learning about the same philosophical topic, freedom. In the example of academic philosophy, students address sophisticated, scholarly problems and arguments about freedom, while in the CoPI example, students raise their own problems and engage in inquiry to resolve these without addressing the scholarship. Although the methods are different, in both examples students develop a better understanding of 'freedom'. I expand on these illustrations in the following sub-sections to discuss why CoPI is more suited for educating for democracy.

Illustration of Academic Philosophy

Jenny's first subject in philosophy is Metaphysics. She thinks she is getting the hang of it, and is starting to understand some of the arguments, but she still struggles. The lecturer sometimes speaks too fast and sometimes too slowly, but at least the notes give a handy outline to follow. She likes the way they set out the four important assumptions commonly made about freedom:

- We are free when our actions are caused by ourselves
- Freedom is incompatible with determinism
- We are determined
- We are free

She also likes how the notes clearly explain how the different traditional positions about freedom result from denying one of these assumptions while accepting the rest:

- If we deny assumption 2 we get compatibilism
- If we deny assumption 3 we get libertarianism
- If we deny assumption 4 we get hard determinism.

Jenny is not quite sure what compatibilism or libertarianism are yet, but she knows she has to write an essay that explains one of them and then examines some arguments for and against. She figures she will be able to understand the positions and the arguments when she has re-read the notes, attended the tutorial and gone over the positions and arguments in her head.

The main feature of this illustration is the focus on arguments and positions from the philosophical tradition. Rather than participating in inquiry, students are presented with the arguments and positions already organised into a logical structure to make them easier to understand. There is no dialogue and the focus is on learning about rather than participating in philosophy, so this practice is not suited for democracy education.

However, It might be objected that I am unfairly rejecting academic philosophy as a medium for education for democracy by focusing on lectures rather than the small group discussions which also occur in academic settings. However, even small group academic discussions are not conducive for education for democracy because the teacher stills controls and directs the discussion without allowing a more democratic exchange, as I illustrate in the following:

Illustration of Academic Philosophy Tutorial

In her tutorial Jenny gets a chance to discuss some of the issues about freedom.

"OK", her tutor Geoff began, "What do you think freedom is?" Jenny was excited. She reckoned that freedom was doing whatever you wanted to, and said so.

"Good", Geoff replied. "Now, how did you come to want the things you want?"

Jenny hadn't thought this far, and she paused, frowning. But another student had a ready answer. "Well, you were born with certain desires, or you pick them up from your environment".

"Ah-Ha!" Geoff exclaimed, "in other words you don't choose your desires, because you are either born with them or you get them from your environment. But if you don't choose what you want, how can you be free when you do what you want? Aren't we controlled by our desires?"

Jenny found this confronting. "But that can't be right," she claimed. "I know I make free choices every day".

"But maybe the feeling that you're free is an illusion", Geoff countered. "This is what motivates the hard determinist position".

Jenny was starting to change her mind. Maybe she was one of those hard determinists.

Although there is student participation and dialogue, it is still inappropriate for education for democracy because of the emphasis on covering the philosophical scholarship. The tutor has a pre-decided agenda of positions and arguments, and only encourages discussion so that students can come to understand these. There is no opportunity for students to raise their own problems and to follow the resulting inquiry where it leads. As such the students are being led and directed by the expert, and do not learn to participate in deliberative inquiry, nor do they develop democratic dispositions.

The philosophical practice in CoPI functions very differently, as I illustrate:

Illustration of Philosophising in CoPI

James looks puzzled. His year four class is participating in a philosophical Community of Inquiry. They had read a story about a boy who was so sick he couldn't go outside and now they were sitting in a circle discussing the ideas from the story to see what questions would arise. James had said that it was a sad story because the boy wasn't free to play outside, but Alisha had disagreed and said the boy didn't want to go outside anyway, so it wasn't sad because he *was* free to do what he wanted. Ying agreed with Alisha. "You're only unfree if you can't do what you want", she argued.

James had a question sparked off by the story, but he was struggling to get the wording right. "What if he wanted to go outside though?" he finally asked. "Yeah", said his friend Sam. "He's not really free because he might want to go outside sometimes".

Mrs. Adams paused the class then and said: "It seems like we have two different views about whether the boy is free. Who agrees with Alisha?" and six or seven children put their hands up. "Who agrees with James" and three children put their hands up. "Who needs more time to make up their minds?" and the rest of the twenty or so students put their hands up. "OK, talk to the people beside you: is the boy in the story free or unfree and why?"

The class broke into small groups of students eagerly discussing their view of freedom and trying to resolve the problem that arose from the difference between Alisha's and James' ideas.

After each student seemed to have developed some ideas, Mrs. Adams drew the class back together. "We're doing some philosophical thinking about whether the boy in the story is free or not," she said. "James and Alisha have put forward two suggestions. What do the rest of you think?"

"I think we need to define freedom before anything else," Amy blurted out.

"Yeah", Ahmed agreed. "If we know what freedom is we can decide whether the boy is free or not".

"So we'll start with trying to define freedom," Mrs Adams said. "What is freedom?"

After some thought, Ying offered a restatement of her earlier suggestion: "Freedom is doing whatever you want".

"Thanks Ying. Are there any other possibilities to consider?" Mrs Adams asked.

"I think freedom is when there is nothing stopping you". Amy suggested.

"Yeah," Jill built on what Amy had said. "Like in the story, his illness stops him doing lots of things so he's not free".

"But that means that I'm not free because gravity stops me flying," John laughed.

"I reckon Ying's idea that freedom is doing what you want is better than the idea that freedom is when nothing stops you. There's always something stopping us, so if freedom was when nothing stopped us, we'd never be free, but we can sometimes do what we want," James concluded.

"I've changed my mind," Amy added. "I agree with Ying's idea as well".

In this example, James' class is pursuing their own inquiry in a CoPI rather than learning about what philosophers have said about freedom. In response to the story they read, they raise philosophical problems and questions which they experience as genuine problems. In their inquiry to resolve the

problems, the students respond to each others' ideas by building, challenging, and testing. Disagreements are occurring, yet these are not treated polemically, but as opportunities to help test the ideas and make progress together. This is more inclusive than the assertive (and sometimes aggressive) intellectual environment that is sometimes associated with philosophy. This is also an example of collaborative philosophy because the thinking work is distributed throughout the class. Each student who contributes does only one part of the philosophical work: Amy suggests a view, Jill elaborates and John explores the implications of this view before James makes a conclusion. With guidance from their teacher, together they follow the inquiry where it leads, rather than being led to understand predetermined outcomes taken from the philosophical scholarship.

In the following sub-sections, I elaborate on these features of a CoPI approach that make it so conducive for education for democracy. CoPI functions as a deliberative democratic community, and so by participating in this community, students are initiated into being democratic. In particular, CoPI functions as a democratic community because this practice of philosophy education involves inquiry, community and care, is inclusive and because the teacher encourages student deliberation rather than directing them to teacher-decided outcomes.

Philosophical Inquiry

CoPI encourages students to develop democratic dispositions because it is a democratic practice of participating in philosophical inquiry, rather than learning about philosophy. It is based on a Deweyan-inspired approach to philosophy as a form of inquiry involving "perseverance in self-correcting exploration of issues that are felt to be important and problematic" (Lipman, 1988, p. 20). These issues are drawn from the lived experience of the students and in particular the philosophical problems they experience. Students then engage with these problems and attempt to resolve them through a process of inquiry, which is shaped by these problems rather than by philosophical scholarship.

Dialogue is the primary mode of philosophical inquiry in CoPI. This involves engagement and exchange with others in a self-corrective inquiry (Lipman, 1988, p. 128) and is different from monological forms of philosophy: "the thinker meditating in solitude, or the Professor holding forth to an audience" (Brennifer, 2007, p. 174).

Collaboration rather than intellectual sparring is an essential feature of this dialogical philosophical practice. Students inquire together rather than present and defend their individual positions and arguments. Suggestions made in a CoPI are not put forward as positions to attack and defend, but as possibilities to be elaborated and tested in a spirit of partnership, joint inquiry, creativity and play with ideas. Students are thus encouraged to be fallible and open with their critical scrutiny, rather than confrontational and polemical.

Community

CoPI is also like a democratic community because the philosophical inquiry involved is not an individual endeavour but occurs in the context of a Community of Inquiry. Such a community need not be a group of people who are all the same, think the same or even who start with an understanding of each other. The community in a Community of inquiry (CI) is a group willing to inquire together about community chosen questions and issues. It is egalitarian, but not all participants need to be equal, and it involves dialogue across difference where everyone has an equal chance to participate.

CoPI students form a community when they come together for the purpose of collaborative inquiry. They commit to addressing common philosophical problems using shared or interpersonal reasonable methods for inquiry (Sharp, 1987, p. 44). Thus the community in a CI is formed in a similar way to how a team or band is formed by a group of people 'playing' together (Glaser, 1998b).

The individuals in a P4C classroom become members of a community of fellow inquirers rather than a collection of individuals (Glaser, 1998a, p. 266) who inquire with others for a common goal, rather

than inquiring in the company of others by offering a series of monologues to meet their individual goals. They are consolidated into "a single community, containing both children and adults engaged in a single inquiry" (Lipman, 2008, p. 109). Participants in a CI thus experience themselves as members of a community and their actions as co-inquiry.

Because of the self-correcting nature of the inquiry, the shared methods employed in a CI are at least partially self-constructed through critical reflection and so the community is strengthened as it establishes its "own procedures for thinking, judging and behaving" (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. 2).

A deeper sense of the community in P4C is developed when, as Lipman argues, "each participant contributes to the single thinking process" (2003, p. 139) and the community as a whole philosophises as a "thinking community" (2003, p. 95). The community thinks together as an instance of shared cognition or distributed thinking, where there is a cognitive division of labour and each member does some of the thinking necessary for the inquiry.

In a prolonged session of private reflection, an individual will engage in a series of mental acts aimed at penetrating and analysing the matter at hand. Thus one will engage in wondering, questioning, inferring, defining, assuming, supposing, imagining, distinguishing, and so on. In shared cognition (also called "distributive thinking"), the same acts are engaged in, but by different members of the community. One person raises a question, another objects to an underlying assumption, still another offers a counterinstance (Lipman, 2003, p. 95).

Through shared cognition the community as a whole takes on its own identity as an inquiring community which cannot be reducible to the identity of the individual members (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. 37).

In these various ways, 'we' the community emerges (Glaser, 1998a, p. 268). This is why we can speak of the community's ideas, questions, inquiry, conclusions and progress, and why it makes sense for those in a CI to say such things as: "We came up with several different perspectives" or "We clarified the difference between friendship and love.' Through participating in such a community, students learn how to participate in a deliberative democratic community.

Caring Ethos

Community and inquiry are connected in CoPI by the ethos of care which is what Splitter and Sharp call the "form of life" (1995, p. 20) or "lived experience" (1995, p. 165) of the CI. The caring 'form of life' gives it the features of an ideal democratic community and allows collaborative inquiry and dialogue across difference. In a CI, students show "care for the procedures of inquiry, care for one another as persons, care for the tradition that one has inherited, care for the creations of one another" (Sharp, 1987, p. 43), as well as care about ideas, issues and concepts (Splitter, 2006, p. 7). Care therefore implies collaboration, rigor, safety, encouragement, responsibility and respect and is the foundation for both philosophical inquiry and its community context. Inquiry requires epistemological care while community requires social care. Each reinforces the other in an ethos of intellectual and social responsibility which is the foundation for a deliberative democracy.

The caring CI involves inclusive and non-adversarial dialogue. In a CI, students care about their own views, but they also care about the views of others and for 'getting to the bottom of things' rather than trying to win arguments. As such the spirit of the CI is collaborative inquiry rather than 'us' versus 'them' or my idea against your idea.

In a caring CI, students are interested in, and listen carefully to, what others have to say. They respectfully "attempt to understand another's perspective from her point of view," even if they do not agree with it, "and only then subject it to critical inquiry" (Sharp, 1987, p. 43). At no time are ideas to be disagreed with before they are given due consideration, and disagreement is always to be respectfully given as a way of moving the discussion forward, not simply for the sake of proving a point.

The collaborative respect involved in a CI is what makes communal inquiry possible. The CI provides a safe (Sharp, 1987, p. 44) and trusting (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. 20) mode of philosophising in a supportive

and nurturing community because it is cooperative rather than competitive. The collaborative nature of CoPI emphasises rigorous thinking and reasonableness while minimising the intellectual risks associated with more polemical styles of philosophy which involve the adversarial attack and defence of positions and arguments. CoPI, in a similar way to feminist philosophy, offers an inclusive alternative to what is seen as the alienating, 'combative', and exclusive practice of much academic philosophy (Moulton, 1983; Sharp, 1993; MacColl, 1994; Collins, 2000). Even when a participant's ideas are being challenged or rejected, this is to be done in a spirit of moving forward together and requires careful listening, consideration of what is heard and then respectfully building on or challenging the ideas suggested. Because students in a CI are to disagree with and challenge ideas not persons, neither disagreement nor challenge is seen as a personal attack, but instead, as the means to advance the joint inquiry. "That's a stupid idea" becomes replaced with "Some reasons to agree are … but a reason to disagree might be …"

By minimising intellectual risks, the caring CI allows dialogue across difference where individuals can inquire together and be a community despite disagreements. Challenge and disagreement is essential for a dialogical-inquiry to move forward or make progress, but it can also tear a community apart if not handled respectfully or safely. Care sustains the underlying relationships of the CI and thus sustains the dialogue even when dealing with challenging subject matter and the resultant differences of opinion.

Participants in a CI also care about advancing their inquiry, so they not only keep the inquiry safe, but also rigorous. They give reasons, justification and support for their suggestions and request the same of others. They are concerned to move outside their own limited points of view and consider a range of possible perspectives, without getting 'trapped' in an assumption, prejudice or mistaken view. They treat all views, including their own, as fallible and thus are willing to critically evaluate all views and to change their minds in accordance with the weight of reasons. They will also offer suggested ideas to public scrutiny as a 'quality control' mechanism so they can get constructive criticism.

The rigorous care in a CI, involving multiple perspectives, fallibilism and public scrutiny of ideas, can be summarised as self-correction. Students care about ideas and they want to correct and improve them. "This means, for example, that [they] are not afraid to modify their point of view or correct any reasoning – their own or that of their fellow members – which seems faulty" (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, pp.18-19).

Being immersed in the caring ethos of rigour, collaborative inquiry, reflection and self-correction encourages the development of what Sharp calls "cognitive virtues" and I have called dispositions, such as: "open-mindedness, willingness to accept criticism, or consider alternative positions, willingness to subject our hypotheses to analysis, willingness to consider reasons… impartiality [and] consistency" (Sharp, 1987, p. 39). By being immersed in the practice of caring, collaborative and rigorous inquiry, P4C students come to be caring, collaborative and rigorous.

Possessing these cognitive virtues is what both Lipman (1988, p. 128) and Siegel (1988, 2003) call 'being reasonable' or "appropriately moved by reasons". Because this involves both epistemic and ethical or social care, being reasonable goes further than being logical. As Rorty explains, care moves us from cold, rational, logic to being a warm, sympathetic human being (1999, p. 82f). Caring thinking strives for the most reasonable perspective that involves empathy, compassion and valuing of the other, not just the most logical argument. Without logical care we get nonsense, but without empathic care we get icy, dehumanised rationality. The CI combines both.

The ethos of care that composes a CI means it has the features of an ideal democratic community involving communal, reasonable, egalitarian, deliberative and participatory dialogue (Cam, 2000; Burgh et. al., 2006, p. 32). Both a CI and an ideal democracy proceed by "exploring different points of view, discussing disagreements reasonably, and keeping an open mind" about issues of importance to the community (Cam, 2006, p. 19). The CI is non-hierarchical and egalitarian and involves open intellectual exchange that "excludes claims based on authority, tradition, force, charisma, or intellectual status" (Kennedy, 1999, p. 345: citing Habermas, 1984, p. 42). Each member can make a contribution and all perspectives and experiences are to be considered without being swayed by irrelevant personal details (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, pp. 34-36). By participating in a CI with these features, children strengthen their civic and democratic character and become democratic (Lipman, 1988, p. 57-61).

Inclusive

CoPI is part of the inclusive philosophical tradition stemming from the practices of Socrates that attempts to make philosophy available for everyone. It is a different tradition from that stemming from Plato's academy that reserves philosophy for the mature, trained scholar. As Lipman says:

"The paradigm of doing philosophy is the towering, solitary figure of Socrates, for whom philosophy was neither an acquisition, nor a profession but a way of life. What Socrates models for us is not philosophy known or philosophy applied but philosophy practiced. He challenges us to acknowledge that philosophy as deed, as form of life, is something that any of us can emulate" (1988, p. 12).[91]

Because of this inclusivity, CoPI enculturates being democratic better than academic philosophy.

The language of philosophy employed in CoPI is inclusive. Philosophising is conducted in everyday language without the barriers posed by the "forbidding terminology" of scholarly traditions of philosophy (Reed, 1992, p. 148-149). Children philosophise in CoPI by doing such things as asking questions (Why …?), giving examples (An example is …), clarifying (I mean …), drawing implications (That means …), suggesting (I think …), and changing their minds (I now think …). Everyone who has the ability to speak can make these philosophical moves and so philosophy is open to everyone in the community of speakers (Lipman, 1988, p. 194-195).

Just as CoPI students do not need to master a technical language to philosophise, they also do not need to learn about the problems and arguments of academic philosophy. Because CoPI addresses problems and issues from the participants' experience, they do not need a mastery of the philosophical scholarship before they can participate in inquiry about these problems.

CoPI is also inclusive because students can participate even if they have not mastered all aspects of philosophical thinking. Individual students can participate in the collaborative philosophical dialogue by listening or by performing only one of the many philosophical moves required for philosophical inquiry because it is not so much the individual child who philosophises as it is the CI as a whole. With orchestration by the CoPI teacher, all the various moves are performed, but each one is performed by a different member of the community. One might provide a suggestion, then another clarifies this suggestion, while two more provide a reason for and against accepting the suggestion. In this way a whole group can operate philosophically even if no one student can do it all on their own (Murris, 2000, p. 263).

The inclusivity of CoPI is also the result of taking a Brunerian approach to philosophy. A Brunerian approach is to argue that any child of any age can approach any discipline, even the most complex and abstract, if that discipline is appropriately positioned (1960, p. 12-13). Put the other way around, CoPI rejects the view that philosophy is so difficult and esoteric that only the mature and intelligent can handle it.[92] Philosophy can be done in a sophisticated form with a high level of scholarship or at a novice level. Children can grasp philosophy in an intuitive and simple form and participate in novice level philosophical thinking, long before they can do the formal, scholarly work associated with academic philosophy.

CoPI thus views children learning philosophy in the same way that most people view children learning mathematics. What goes on in academic mathematics departments is sophisticated and specialised and beyond most children. However, this does not mean that when five year olds count rocks that they are not doing mathematics. It may not be of the same sophistication or complexity but it is age appropriate mathematical thinking. Likewise even though children might not produce sophisticated essays and papers on contemporary philosophical issues, they can do philosophy. For example, although young

91 Although informative, the analogy to Socratic philosophy can be taken too far. Much of the Socratic practice, as depicted in Plato's dialogues, is overly directive and inconsistent with the open dialogue necessary for a CoPI and education for democracy. Socrates sometimes seems to be pushing an agenda and more or less subtly manipulating his interlocutors, rather than openly following the inquiry where it might lead.

92 See Kitchener (1990) for a good overview of the arguments that children cannot do philosophy because it is too complex for them. However, many of the arguments do not apply to the philosophical practice of P4C, but only to an exclusive conception of philosophy. See Murris (2000) for an overview of the case that children can do philosophy when philosophy is appropriately reconstructed, pitched at the right level, and made inclusive.

children doing CoPI would not write essays analysing different positions and arguments about the traditional problem of free-will, this does not exclude them from philosophy. Instead, they converse "about philosophical topics in ordinary language disciplined by logical constraints" (Lipman, 1988, p. 143). They would, for example, consider how much freedom they have, listen to the ideas of others, consider problems with their initial thoughts and modify their views in response.

In particular, Bruner's idea of the spiral curriculum is relevant for understanding how children approach philosophy at a novice level in CoPI. Young children engage with basic ideas from the discipline of philosophy and use foundational philosophical thinking. They then revisit these over the years in more and more complex forms. For example, five year olds might think about what it means to be a friend in concrete terms, and then come back to this concept in more and more sophisticated and abstract ways in later years by considering the connections between friendship and trust, integrity, happiness and living a good life. Although they might not be considering the most sophisticated philosophical problems, they are considering simpler versions that arise in their conceptions.

Even if we take the exclusive position that real philosophy is only the most rigorous inquiry done in universities, we should acknowledge that there is a developmental process to philosophical thinking. This starts with very young children learning to state their beliefs on philosophical issues such as friendship, and giving reasons in support ("I think friends should always share because it's mean to not share and friends are not mean to each other"). This is a necessary developmental stage before they can learn to state and evaluate arguments for and against, say, a Platonic position about friendship. But if we admit that there is such a developmental process, it seems unnecessary to withhold the name 'philosophy' from what children do during this developmental process. Children doing CoPI are obviously not academic philosophers yet they are philosophising.

Lastly, CoPI is inclusive because it rejects the Piagetian view that children are incapable of philosophical thinking. The standard interpretation of Piaget's theory of cognitive development is that children go through fixed, age-based stages of cognitive development and they can't think in the patterns of higher stages. In particular, because children have not reached the adult stage of abstract reasoning, they are inherently unable to handle the complexity and rigour of philosophy.

CoPI rejects this Piagetian position as it does not apply when the philosophical practice has been reconstructed to be inclusive, as it has been in CoPI. Nor does it apply when children have had philosophical experience, as they have by participating in CoPI. There is ample evidence that children have the capabilities they need to philosophise when they have had the opportunity and training in a philosophical CI. For instance, see Matthews (1978, 1980, 1984) for a wide variety of examples of young children engaging in complex and abstract philosophical dialogue and exploration.

Modern neo-Piagetians take a similar position to CoPI that children can have the cognitive capacity to do philosophy. Cognitive acceleration theorists agree with Piaget that there are stages of thinking that humans go through in their normal development, and that early, concrete stages of thinking are not sufficiently sophisticated to support philosophical thinking. Yet they present evidence that children can be 'accelerated' to higher, abstract stages by being confronted with an appropriate cognitive challenge (Adey and Shayer, 2002; Shayer, 1997). With the right challenge, children can engage in the abstract thought necessary for philosophy, and CoPI provides just such a challenge.

In these ways the philosophical practice of CoPI is inclusive and accessible to children. CoPI students are initiated into a practice of philosophical inquiry that is appropriate for them, rather than being initiated into the scholarly practice of academic philosophy, or being taught the subject 'philosophy'. Children can participate in CoPI because they inquire in ordinary language, in a safe, supportive dialogue, about problems from their own experience. There is no barrier posed by convoluted texts, or lengthy periods of training and apprenticeship to gain the specialist knowledge that would be required for mastering a 'subject', and the philosophical work is distributed so that individual students can participate and develop the needed cognitive skills without first having extensive experience. By participating in such an inclusive inquiry, students develop the skills and dispositions needed for an inclusive, deliberative, democratic community.

Inquiry-encouraging Not Outcome-leading

A fundamental difference between academic philosophy and CoPI, and a central reason why CoPI is more democratic, is the role the philosophy teacher plays in each practice. The teacher in CoPI encourages collaborative deliberation about issues of common concern, while the academic teacher directs and leads students to authoritative positions, arguments, distinctions and interpretations about issues from the scholarship. The main objective of the CoPI teacher is to run their class as a CI where students participate in philosophy as a collaborative inquiry. To do this, the CoPI teacher needs to be 'philosophically self-effacing but procedurally strong' (Lipman and Sharp, 1982, p. vii; Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. 149). They do not have an agenda of philosophical arguments and positions that must be covered and instead emphasise the procedures of philosophical inquiry. This means they are not the "informational authority" (Lipman, 1988, p. 96) and cannot claim to have the answers in advance (Burgh et al., 2006, p. 152).

CoPI teachers are to avoid what Splitter and Sharp call "pre-empted conclusions" (1995, p. 137-139) and what I call "pre-decided outcomes" or "pre-decided milestones". A pre-decided outcome is some substantive point that the teacher decides must be addressed or reached in the inquiry. One type of pre-decided outcome (probably uncommon in philosophy teaching) is a final conclusion that that the teacher pre-determines the students should adopt at the end of their inquiry. Other types of pre-decided outcomes (perhaps better called milestones) are aspects of the intellectual terrain that must be addressed or covered during the inquiry, such as an argument that must be considered, a distinction that must be made, an interpretation or implication that must be acknowledged, or a line of inquiry that must be pursued. A pre-decided outcome could be determined before an inquiry begins, but the teacher could also decide during an inquiry that the inquiry must cover particular milestones.

CoPI teachers avoid pre-decided outcomes and encourage students to follow the inquiry where it leads. Academic teachers, on the other hand, have to cover a body of scholarship, and so embrace pre-decided outcomes. Thus the academic teacher could be described as outcome-leading (as in the tutorial illustration) while the CoPI teacher is inquiry-encouraging. The outcome-leading teacher listens to what students say and evaluates whether they have covered the 'correct' content, argument or interpretation, and if not, they direct them (subtly or not) to this. The inquiry-encouraging teacher does not have a pre-decided outcome in mind and instead evaluates what further thinking would be useful to advance the inquiry, for example, perhaps students need to justify, clarify or compare their ideas. [93]

By avoiding pre-decided outcomes, and emphasising the process of philosophical inquiry, the CoPI teacher is able to engage in genuine inquiry with their students. A genuine inquiry occurs when neither teacher nor students have the answers before-hand, and thus they have to follow the inquiry where it leads (Burgh et. al., 2006, 51, p. 152). A genuine inquiry is "a process of discovery and invention – bringing together different perspectives and building on these differences" rather than "a process of working inexorably and inflexibly towards a predetermined answer" (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. 139).

In a genuine inquiry, the teacher becomes a co-inquirer with students (Burgh et. al., 2006, p. 111; Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p. 149). Although the teacher will be likely to have their own answers to the questions being discussed, and their own views about what arguments and distinctions need to be considered, they do not lead students to these answers or outcomes. Their role is to "*relearn* all this when they are engaged with students" (Burgh, et al., 2006, p. 86). The teacher must be ready to re-discover and re-construct philosophical ideas, rather than presenting pre-existing ideas or taking students down pre-existing paths. They are not instructing them so much as participating in the philosophical inquiry with them – albeit as a more skilled participant and coach who scaffolds and supports the students so they learn how to philosophise for themselves. By participating in such a co-inquiry, students learn to operate as participants in a deliberative democratic community.

93 Although CoPI teachers reject pre-decided outcomes, this does not mean that they take a completely free approach to inquiry. A free discussion would not be conducive for democratic education as such discussions tend to be nothing more than an exchange of opinions without critical reflection. This is more likely to enculturate a superficial relativism where all views are taken to be equally good, than the dispositions of deliberative democracy. CoPI, on the other hand, provides the minimal imtervention needed to cultivate democratic dispositions and skills in their students.

Conclusion

In this paper I considered which practices would be suitable for philosophy education for democracy. I argued that for a practice to be suitable it must educate for democratic knowledge, skills and dispositions, and in order to educate for philosophical dispositions, a philosophical practice must provide a model of deliberative democratic society that students can be initiated into. Such a practice of philosophical education needs to be collaborative, dialogical, inclusive, and participatory (rather than authoritative, monological and exclusive). My conclusion is that the Community of Philosophical Inquiry approach is suitable for education for democracy whereas the academic approach is not. When students engage in a CoPI, they engage in rigorous philosophical inquiry and learn to be deliberative. They experience themselves as part of a deliberative community where "we inquire together" and they learn to be part of a community. They learn to care both for their inquiry and for each other, and so learn how to participate in a deliberative, democratic community, despite the inevitable disagreements.

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